UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNA SONGSTAD,

Plaintiff(s),

No. C10-2401 BZ

V.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRUCE EDWARD BEGEMANN,

Defendant(s).

Defendant(s).

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Before the Court is plaintiff Jenna Songstad's motion for default judgment. Docket No. 16. On May 28, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Bruce Begemann for (1) sexual battery in violation of California Civil Code § 1708.5; (2) childhood sexual abuse in violation of California Penal Code § 647.6; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant was served with the complaint on September 21, 2010. Docket No. 8. Defendant failed to answer the

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 12, 2010 which changed the amount of damages she was seeking from "in no event less than [\$75,000.00]" for each of her claims to \$250,000.00 for each claim. See Docket No. 12. Plaintiff did not personally serve the amended complaint on defendant. Docket No. 12-1. My recommendation to award plaintiff

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complaint or otherwise defend the action. On January 18, 2011, upon plaintiff's request, the Clerk entered defendant's default under Rule 55(a). Docket No. 17. Plaintiff now moves for default judgment, seeking general, special, and punitive damages. Plaintiff also seeks to recover her attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 1708.5. Because defendant has not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter will be reassigned to a district judge with the following report and recommendation for default judgment.

Under FRCP 55(b)(2), the Court may enter a default judgment against a party whose default has been entered. The decision to grant or deny a default judgment under FRCP 55(b) is within the discretion of the Court. <u>Eitel v. McCool</u>, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court may not enter a default judgment against an unrepresented minor, an incompetent person, or a person in military service. <u>See</u> FRCP 55(b)(2); 50 App. U.S.C. § 521. Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing, by way of declaration and testimony at the hearing, that defendant is not a child, an incompetent, or in military service. <u>See</u> Declaration of Jonathan K. Van Patten ¶ 8.

Although a formal hearing is not required for the Court to render a default judgment, <u>Davis v. Fendler</u>, 650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981), plaintiff has the burden of proving damages through testimony, written affidavit, or other relevant

^{\$275,000.00} is based on the original complaint which sought at least \$75,000.00 for each claim.

evidence. See Bd. of Trs. of the Boilermaker Vacation Trust
v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

Here an evidentiary hearing was held at plaintiff's request.

See Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1152 (3rd Cir. 1990); Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods.,

Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323-4 (7th Cir. 1983).

By defaulting, defendant is deemed to have admitted the well-pleaded averments of the complaint, except those as to the amount of damages. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d); Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, plaintiff has pled that when she was 16, defendant willfully and maliciously touched her breasts and genital area in a sexually offensive manner without her consent. Defendant's conduct was outrageous and as a result of his malice plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Based on plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations, she has established that defendant is liable for sexual battery, childhood sexual abuse, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1708.5 (sexual battery) makes it unlawful when a person acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.

³ California Penal Code Section 647.6 prohibits the molestation of individuals under 18.

The following elements must be established to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff[] suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991)(quoting Davidson v. City of

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Having determined that default judgment should be granted, the only remaining issue is the relief available to the plaintiff. See 3A Entm't Ltd v. Constant Entm't, Inc., 2009 WL 248261 at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiff seeks the following remedies from the Court: (1) judgment against the defendant awarding general, special, and punitive damages; (2) reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 1708.5; (3) costs, interest, disbursements incurred in this action;

and (4) further relief as the Court deems necessary.

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she was from a

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she was from a small town in South Dakota where she lived on a farm with her parents. As a teenager, she began staying with her aunt and uncle in San Jose during the summers. Plaintiff's family believed that living in a bigger city would help make her less shy. During the summer of 2008, plaintiff, then 16, her aunt and uncle's family, and some of their close family friends, including defendant, drove to her family's cabin in Clear Lake for Memorial Day weekend. One night, while several people were socializing in the billiards room, defendant gave plaintiff alcoholic drinks without permission from plaintiff's aunt. Plaintiff's aunt was upset when she discovered defendant drinking with plaintiff. She instructed plaintiff to drink lots of water, causing plaintiff to vomit. Plaintiff then went to sleep.

Several hours later, defendant entered the room where plaintiff was sleeping and laid down next to her. She was

^{28 &}lt;u>Westminister</u>, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982)).

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sexually inexperienced. Plaintiff awoke when defendant began to touch her and fondle her breasts. Plaintiff testified that she was shocked by defendant's behavior and was not sure what to do. She pretended to be asleep in the hope that defendant would stop, but defendant continued to grope her. When defendant touched her genital area and digitally penetrated her, plaintiff ran out of the room and spent the night by herself in another part of the house. She estimated that this incident lasted about 20 minutes.

Defendant's actions left plaintiff traumatized. She was initially afraid to tell her aunt because she did not want to cause problems between her family and their friend, the defendant. But, after driving back to San Jose, she reported defendant's conduct to her aunt, who subsequently notified the police. Defendant was arrested, pled guilty and spent four weeks in jail.

Plaintiff and her aunt testified that her mental health changed dramatically after the incident. She attended weekly counseling sessions for the rest of the summer and after returning to South Dakota. Plaintiff was depressed and cried frequently. She also experienced constant anxiety that led to paranoia and panic attacks. Plaintiff began taking antidepressant and anti-anxiety medication. In response to the stress, plaintiff developed a problem with pulling out her eyelashes and vomiting after meals. She lost confidence in herself and found it difficult to interact with others,

⁵ Plaintiff's aunt paid about \$3500.00 for these counseling sessions.

particularly men, whom she no longer trusted.

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Plaintiff remains affected by the incident to this day. She still suffers from mental health issues and is afraid to be alone or around people she does not know. She testified that earlier this month, on July 4, she went back to her family's cabin on Clear Lake for the first time. She was unable to enter the room where the incident took place and experienced a panic attack. She is concerned that she will never be able to get over defendant's conduct.

Based on plaintiff and her aunt's testimony, and the well-pled allegations of her complaint, I find that defendant's conduct was outrageous and constituted willful and malicious injury to the plaintiff, causing her to suffer severe and extreme emotional distress. Specifically, defendant deliberately and intentionally injured the plaintiff, the act was wrongful, and it was done without just cause or excuse. Plaintiff's testimony about her distress was genuine and it appears likely that she will continue to be distressed for some time. In recommending an award of general damages, I consider that plaintiff was molested by a family friend, who she trusted, in her family's cabin. Plaintiff's age, background and sexual inexperience especially made her especially vulnerable and made it more difficult for her to deal with the ramifications of defendant's inappropriate conduct. I also consider that plaintiff will always have to deal with the fact that her first sexual experience happened when an older, trusted man molested her. Under such circumstances, and based on the severe emotional distress

caused by defendant's acts which plaintiff established at the hearing, I recommend awarding her \$250,000.00 in damages.

Plaintiff also requested special and punitive damages. Plaintiff's counseling bills approximated \$3,500.00, but the aunt paid for the counseling and she is not a plaintiff. Nor is there any evidence that she assigned her claim to the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, I do not recommend awarding special damages.

As for punitive damages, there is not direct evidence of defendant's wealth. There is evidence that he has an ownership interest in one or more homes, though what his interest is following his divorce is not clear. Defendant's conduct was oppressive and malicious. Given the limited evidence of defendant's wealth, I recommend an award of \$25,000.00 in punitive damages.

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover attorneys' fees under Section 1708.5. Section 1708.5, however, does not specifically allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees. It only provides that courts "may award equitable relief, including, but not limited to, an

While plaintiff seeks damages on each claim, there was only one tortious act and one set of damages. I do not recommend awarding plaintiff damages for each of her three claims. Plaintiff has cited no authority for such a result, and to do so would violate the general theory of damages which bars double recovery for the same wrong. See Tavaglione v. Billings, 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1159 (1993)("Regardless of the nature or number of legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited.")(internal citations omitted).

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injunction, costs, and any other relief the court deems proper." The omission of attorneys' fees from the statute does not appear to be accidental since the very next statute, Section 1708.6, explicitly allows plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees for torts of domestic violence. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.6(c)("and any other relief that the court deems proper, including reasonable attorneys' fees")(emphasis added). Plaintiff has not presented any argument to support her request for attorneys' fees nor has she submitted any fees that she wishes to recover for. Accordingly, I do not recommend awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees.

With respect to costs, which are recoverable under Section 1708.5, plaintiff failed to submit any evidence of her costs in either her papers or at the hearing. I recommend granting plaintiff her legally recoverable costs as prevailing party. Rule 54(d)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that judgment be entered in plaintiff's favor for \$275,000.00 and legally recoverable costs.

Dated: July 28, 2011

Bernárá Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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